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Abstract—Maintaining systems of military plans is critical for 
military effectiveness, but is also challenging. Plans will become 
obsolete as the world diverges from the assumptions on which 
they rest. If too many ad hoc changes are made to intermeshed 
plans, the ensemble may no longer lead to well-synchronized and 
coordinated operations, resulting in the system of plans becoming 
itself incoherent. We describe in what follows an Adaptive 
Planning process that we are developing on behalf of the Air 
Force Research Laboratory (Rome) with the goal of addressing 
problems of these sorts through cyclical collaborative plan review 
and maintenance. The interactions of world state, blue force 
status and associated plans are too complex for manual adaptive 
processes, and computer-aided plan review and maintenance is 
thus indispensable. We argue that appropriate semantic 
technology can 1) provide richer representation of plan-related 
data and semantics, 2) allow for flexible, non-disruptive, agile, 
scalable, and coordinated changes in plans, and 3) support more 
intelligent analytical querying of plan-related data.  
Keywords—adaptive planning; outcomes assessment; ontology 
I. THE NEED FOR ADAPTIVE PLANNING 
“No plan survives first contact with the enemy” 
(Clausewitz, On War). Real world uncertainties all but 
guarantee that even the most carefully developed plan will not 
be carried out exactly as intended. The military response, as in 
the business domain, has been to increase the speed and agility 
of planning and execution [1-4]. On the strategic level, the 
transition from the Joint Operation Planning and Execution 
System (JOPES) to an Adaptive Planning and Execution 
(APEX) system exemplifies this trend. In addition to speeding 
up the deliberate planning and review cycle, these efforts seek 
to increase the number of planned options and contingencies. 
According to the Adaptive Roadmap II, signed by the 
Secretary of Defense in March 2008, the ultimate goal is to 
provide plans that are “maintained continuously within a 
collaborative environment” to reflect any changes that impact 
any significant aspects of a plan. Such plans will together form 
something the Adaptive Roadmap calls a “living plan.” Plans 
may need to be adjusted to maintain their relevance based on 
changes in the world (e.g., weather, location of enemy troops, 
troop readiness, air assets). Additionally, they may need to be 
adjusted in order to maintain their coherence within a system 
of plans, such as when the goals of supporting or supported 
plans change. 
II. THE IDEA OF THE LIVING PLAN
In the current state of military planning – as encapsulated in 
Joint Doctrine (JP 5.0) – a distinction is drawn between 
deliberate planning and crisis action planning. Deliberate 
planning is supply driven. Plans are static information objects 
created as the outputs of a deliberative, rule-governed process, 
and stored in a repository until needed. They may be created 
years ahead of actual use, or they may never be used at all. 
Crisis actions plans are demand driven: something happened 
and we need an urgent response; because the response should 
involve a degree of organized action, planning is needed. Crisis 
action planning is a response to the uncertainty involved in our 
knowledge of real-world states. But even deliberate planning 
rests on an institutional acknowledgement of our inability to 
accurately predict the future, in that Doctrine allows the 
making of ad hoc resource requests which deviate from the 
deliberate plan as specified. Sometimes, on first contact with 
the enemy, deliberate plans break and workarounds are needed. 
Regardless of the quality of the prior deliberation that went into 
the deliberate plan, the need for such corrective actions as a 
result of the unanticipated interactions between blue forces and 
the world make for suboptimal procedures.  
The goal of the living plan is to remove this ‘breaks 
because it would not bend’ feature of the deliberative plan by 
minimizing the distinction between deliberate planning and 
crisis action planning through a new type of planning process 
that is marked by constant update in light of updates in our 
real-world knowledge. The idea is to embed into the very 
fabric of plan representation our uncertainties about the world, 
so that the activity of planning is transformed from one of the 
creation of plans as outputs to a process of continuous plan 
development. The living plan itself becomes a probabilistic, 
branching information artifact – a representation of the 
moment-to-moment intentions not merely of single platoon 
commanders but of the military as a whole. It incorporates at 
each phase representations of multiple alternative courses of 
action which are continuously changing in light of actual and 
projected states of the world, adjacent plans, supporting and 
supported plans. 
III. ADAPTIVE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS
We believe that any computational approach to supporting 
the Secretary of Defense’s goal for living plans must meet six 
critical requirements.  
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First, it must be able to represent all the types of entities 
and relationships, knowledge about which is important to 
maintaining a living plan. This requires a highly expressive 
representational capability to capture, manage, and reason 
over plans, plan elements (e.g., goals, available assets, weather, 
battle terrain), and their relations within a system of plans.  
Second, any approach must be able to detect meaningful 
changes that impact plan relevance and coherence. This 
requires effective monitoring and sensitivity analysis to identify 
in a reliable and scalable way those changes which are of 
significance to the system of plans [5,6]. Recognition of the 
significant changes must then trigger processes that maintain 
the relevance and coherence of this system at multiple levels 
and across plan elements.  
Third, any approach requires coordinated adjustment 
processes, which are needed to fulfill the second requirement 
(above). Such processes must be able to run independently, be 
applicable (when necessary) to real-time conditions, and be 
capable of harmonizing with other large-scale plan 
adjustments. 
Fourth, any such approach requires automated information 
extraction and routing because maintaining realistic plans 
requires more information processing than can be achieved 
through manual methods alone.  
Fifth, whether in support of human planners, warfighters 
during mission execution, operations assessment staff, or 
automated systems performing the same tasks, any approach 
needs to support analytical queries against the ensemble of 
plan-related data. Since plan-related data is very hetero-
geneous, this amounts to applying a unified structured query 
front end to structured and unstructured data on the backend.  
Sixth, joint warfighters at all levels of command will need 
to collaboratively plan and execute in conjunction with semi-
automated adaptive planning systems. Therefore, any approach 
for providing living plans must support extensible and versatile 
interactive applications that can deal with the sorts of diverse 
but integrated user environments required for living plans.  
Relative to the six requirements described above for 
supporting the Secretary of Defense’s goal for living plans, our 
overall approach is based on the idea that semantic 
representation of data by means of ontologies, combined with 
probabilistic classifiers operating in a transactional 
environment, will allow the needed representation, monitoring, 
analysis, sharing and querying of information at distinct levels 
of granularity and detail and across distinct applications. The 
system will be required, for example, to display a JFACC’s 
view of ATO mission plans, a squadron Commander’s view of 
the day’s mission plan, and STRATCOM’s view of a Theater. 
As in other domains, the semantic approach is designed to 
reduce information siloes, and enable effective tailoring of 
knowledge and information to different needs. It is designed 
also in such a way as to allow incremental improvements over 
time, as shortcomings in the framework uncovered at any given 
stage are rectified in subsequent stages. 
In what follows we focus on the first and fifth requirements 
described above: for rich representations of data and semantics, 
and for the capacity to use such representations in mounting 
queries against plan-related data.  
As regards the former, we describe the coverage domain of 
our proposed Plan Ontology (see Figure 2) in terms of how we: 
(a) model plans in terms of cyclical phase-specific attributes; 
(b) embed metrics that relate plans to world conditions; and (c) 
embed meta-metrics that use the metrics under (b) to create an 
incremental plan and plan-execution improvement process 
across the whole system. On each level multiple families of 
related terms will be required, including definitions and axioms 
specifying the relations between them.  
As regards the latter, we describe how queries are passed 
through parts of the system in order to illustrate some of the 
semantic relations that need to be computed in order to support 
analytically useful queries over living plan data. 
 
Figure 1: Fragment of the draft Plan Ontology at http://ncor.buffalo.edu/plan-ontology
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IV. REPRESENTING PLANS IN RECURRING PHASES 
To better understand and support the notion of continuous, 
living plans, we require a view of planning that is more 
abstract than is traditionally employed. The simplistic notion of 
‘the plan’ created prior to ‘the execution’ is at odds with our 
view of planning as a dynamic, continuous, iterative process 
that not only adapts to the effects of planned actions, but also 
adapts the process of planning itself in ways designed to 
achieve more satisfactory outcomes over time. 
Our model focuses on three primary factors in the planning 
process: 
1. different phases of the planning process (successive 
phases within a given course of planning processes), 
2. types of judgments within each of those phases that 
enable effective planning, and 
3. information, including metrics, on which these 
judgments are grounded. 
On the traditional view, planning only happens periodically 
as a precursor to its execution. Here, in contrast, we view the 
total planning process computationally as forming a series of 
parallel, interacting courses or flows at a number of different 
levels. These processes unfold dynamically, with changes in 
any given course being communicated to parallel and 
hierarchically related courses wherever changes in the latter are 
required. The system is organized in such a way that updated 
versions of needed plans and subplans can be generated at any 
point in time.  
Each parallel course is itself seen as being organized into a 
succession of three phases corresponding roughly to the first 
three phases of the well-known Plan Do Check Act (PDCA) 
cycle, and similar models. A difference is that the phases in our 
framework are viewed as continuous and intermeshed with 
each other rather than discreet. Especially the Act phase, where 
adaptive actions are taken, is distributed and continuous across 
the other phases.  
x development – This phase consists of processes of 
identifying, considering, selecting, constructing, and/or 
modifying potential courses-of-action (COAs) that are 
expected to satisfy a goal. This includes the process of 
creating and maintaining potentially executable ‘plans 
sitting on the shelf’ in traditional, deliberate planning – 
referred to in our ontology as ‘plan specifications’. The 
distinguishing feature of this phase is that there has 
been no decision to take actual actions in conformity 
with and under commitment to any specific plan.  
x execution – This phase involves processes of planning 
while acting according to a particular planned COA. 
Unlike random or spontaneous actions, such planned 
processes can be evaluated relative to the plan. For 
example, indicators can be used to judge whether the 
intermediate effects of planned actions are consistent 
with expectations. But, as the plan has not yet 
terminated, the net effect of all planned actions relative 
to the goal set forth in the plan cannot be judged. A 
key planning process in the execution phase is the 
making of a decision to terminate execution because 
the goal has been achieved, or because the plan is no 
longer relevant or coherent, or is being executed 
unsatisfactorily. 
x post-execution – This phase involves the post-
execution processes of interpreting and judging an 
executed plan and its outcomes relative to 
expectations. In this process, all actions taken under 
commitment to the plan have been taken. Thus their 
net effect can be assessed relative to the specified goal. 
The primary purpose of the processes involved in this 
post-execution phase is to enhance future planning, for 
example by: 
o defining new goals; 
o clarifying existing goals; 
o improving effectiveness in achieving goals. 
Associated with processes of each of the mentioned types 
are four basic planning-related judgments that enable reasoning 
aimed at leading to the creation and selection of better plans: 
x relevance – How well does the current state of 
planning relate to actual or anticipated external world 
conditions, such as constraints, opportunities, planned 
outcomes, unplanned side-effects, etc.?  
x coherence – How well do the processes of planning 
on-going in the current phases relate to other 
synergistic planning processes. In other words, are they 
in conflict or coherent with other friendly force, 
coalition, political, etc. planning?  
x planning-assessment – How well were the processes in 
each phase of planning performed by the planner, from 
a single person to an organization?  
x meta-metric learning – How well does the current set 
of metrics support the goal of evolutionary 
improvement of the entire planning process (and, as a 
consequence thereof, the entire process of creating and 
executing and evaluating plans)?  
V. REPRESENTING RECURRING CLASSES OF METRICS IN 
SUPPORT OF CYCLICAL PLAN PHASES 
In this section, we bring together the three factors of 
planning outlined above – phases, judgments, and metrics – to 
see how they merge to form a more complete picture of a 
continuous adaptive planning process. For each combination of 
planning phase and judgment we provide example metrics. 
These are provided here for illustrative purposes only, and 
especially as concerns plan execution our framework will draw 
on the extensive list of Measures of Effectiveness and 
Performance identified in salient doctrine for the tasks of the 
Universal Joint Task List, for example as described at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a398683.pdf 
A. Plan Development Phase 
1) Relevance 
Example metrics informing the judgment whether a 
potential plan will be relevant to some anticipated world state: 
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x Values and locations of relevant adversary assets (a 
plan to invade a country to remove WMD stockpiles 
would be irrelevant if there were no stockpiles, or if 
existing stockpiles were unreachable in a timely 
manner) 
x Number of red operational defensive SAM sites (a 
plan that did not either act to reduce this number, or 
account for blue attrition because of them, would not 
be relevant)  
x Number of blue re-fueling tankers available during 
a period (a plan with more missions than could be 
supported for refueling would not be relevant)  
x Network of adversary command communications (a 
plan that intends to cripple communications by taking 
out a central node is not relevant if the network is 
decentralized and/or has alternate paths)  
2) Coherence 
Example metrics informing the judgment of whether a 
potential plan will be coherent with other related planning: 
x Rates of attrition of shared assets (a plan that over-
optimistically assumes assets will remain available 
after another plan executes is not coherent)  
x Times of anticipated/actual actions that are signs of 
intentions (a plan that assumes an element of surprise 
is not coherent with another plan that takes earlier 
actions that signal a shared or related intent)  
x Intentions of non-military planning in Area of 
Operations (a military plan that depends on large-
scale destruction of economic infrastructure, apparatus 
of civil authority, etc. is not coherent with a political 
plan that seeks to rapidly restore civil rest and order) 
3) Planning Assessment 
Example metrics informing the assessment of planning 
performance during plan development:  
x Time required to reach plan execution phase 
(compared to predicted, needed, historical, and so on)  
x Number of substantially different COAs and 
embedded options considered (based on the 
assumption that the larger the number of options the 
better is the understanding of the space of options)  
x Number of relevance and coherence metrics 
considered (by some definition of considered and a 
procedure for counting separate metrics)  
x Length of review chain prior to approval by 
Commander (includes first-pass and re-review cycles) 
4) Meta-Metric Learning 
Example meta-metrics describing how well the relevance, 
coherence and planning assessment metrics support plan 
development, and enable improvement of the metrics – and 
thus of the total planning process – over time. Meta-metric 
learning often requires data over combinations of planning 
phases. 
x Inter-phase meta-metrics deriving from 
correlations between some earlier-phase metric 
with some later-phase metric relating to outcomes 
(for example: if the number of options embedded in 
COAs has historically correlated positively with post-
execution assessment metrics indicating greater 
satisfaction of plan goals, then it may become a more 
positive metric that is given greater weight in future 
plans)  
x Correlation between intra-phase metrics generally 
considered positive (or negative) (for example: the 
number of COA options considered is itself to be 
viewed as a positive metric; but if this number goes up 
in such a way that the time required to bring a plan to 
execution goes up at the same time (which is 
considered negative), then this suggests an 
optimization is possible, or perhaps a different metric, 
such as measuring the difference in time between 
completing a plan and its estimated time of execution 
rather than total time)  
x Percent of relevance and coherence metrics with 
measures above a certain level of belief/confidence 
(over time, the confidence in metrics should be driven 
up, for example the confidence in metrics of adversary 
state such as number of SAM sites should be actively 
improved with better sensors and analysis processes) 
x Number of corrections made to a metric 
(‘corrections’ means: substantial changes in a metric 
which are made on the basis of evidence contradictory 
to the original estimate of what sort of metric would be 
needed; for example: contradictory evidence that the 
current WMD estimate, made by whatever process, is 
wrong leads to improving the process that led to this 
estimate). 
B. Plan Execution 
1) Relevance 
Metrics informing the judgment whether an actual plan 
being executed remains relevant to actual conditions, such as 
constraints and opportunities:  
x Cloud height over intended target (may violate 
constraint of target visibility)  
x Number/rate of adversary unit surrenders or other 
change in adversary offensive activity (may indicate 
plan assumptions regarding adversary’s will to fight 
are incorrect or not relevant)  
x Aggregate Measures of Performance (MOPs) for 
current actions (low levels of mission performance 
may indicate that the pre-conditions and contexts for 
actual actions were not satisfactorily planned – for 
example low levels of destroy, degrade, deny, disrupt 
(4Ds) may indicate poor intelligence, weaponeering, 
etc.)  
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2) Coherence 
Example metrics informing the judgment whether a plan 
remains coherent over time:  
x Changes in planned asset availability committed by 
other plans (for example: there are assets which the 
plan assumes other plans do not require)  
x Success rate of synchronization points (if plans have 
explicit specifications of COA relationships, defined-
execution windows, handoffs, meetings, supporting 
events, and so on, then what is the rate at which these 
relations are successfully maintained?)  
3) Planning Assessment 
Example metrics informing the assessment of whether the 
plan is being executed satisfactorily:  
x Percent of scheduled missions flown on time 
(assessing compliance with plan, not outcomes)  
x Rate COA modifications made per unit time (a 
better specified plan might require a lower rate of 
modifications)  
x Aggregate time delays of actual execution for 
planned simultaneous actions (for example in mass-
ing fires in planned combined air strike and artillery)  
x Time from a relevant change in world state to the 
appropriate change in COA (for example: time from 
when the new target location information is obtained to 
time when a new mission tasking has been created that 
accounts for the new information)  
4) Meta-Metric Learning 
Meta-metrics describing how well the relevance, coherence 
and planning assessment metrics support plan execution, and 
enable improvement of the metrics:  
x Inter-phase metric correlation (for example: low 
correlation between missions flown on time and post-
execution MOE metrics may suggest that flight 
promptness is not as important as thought, perhaps 
because late flights were able to act on better, more 
recent information)  
x Intra-phase metric correlation (for example: a nega-
tive correlation of rate of COA changes and aggregate 
time delays of planned simultaneous actions may sug-
gest that allowing more frequent COA changes to con-
structively maintain coherence is beneficial, notwith-
standing the expected disruptive effect of the changes; 
better metrics might distinguish COA changes by class 
of initiating event, such as new information, command 
decision, and so on; as the framework itself becomes 
more sophisticated in its reasoning power, more 
frequent COA changes will themselves become more 
easily accommodated by the planning system)  
C. Post Execution 
1) Relevance 
These are metrics informing the judgment of the effects of 
the executed plan on world state, particularly relative to intend-
ed outcomes. In addition to the more typical post-operations 
assessment process, there are other ways to conceptualize post-
execution relevance. For example: do the lessons drawn from 
assessment have relevance to the current or future world? Is the 
originally desired outcome – such as destroying (or building 
up) another actor’s offensive capability (for example arming 
the Taliban) of continued relevance? Or is it becoming less 
relevant, for example because they have changed sides? 
x Number of missiles landing in homeland (this is said 
to have been the post-execution operations metric for 
the recent Gaza invasion)  
x Number of computer systems not patched for 
exploit X (exploit X might have worked well on this 
occasion, but if the adversary has since learned about it 
and therefore patched the prior vulnerability, the 
simple assessment that it worked well previously is not 
particularly relevant for future planning) 
2) Coherence 
Metrics informing the judgment how the net outcome is 
coherent with other plans (in any phase) 
x Actual asset attrition (for example: achieving the 
current plan objective with more or fewer bullets may 
not matter to the current plan, but it may harm/limit 
other planning. This is following the notion that 
Relevance is assessing the relation of the outcome to 
the current world state, so Coherence would be the 
relation between the outcome and other plans.)  
x Degree to which actual net outcome facilitates or 
limits COAs of future plans (e.g., confident removal 
of WMD threat makes other plans easier to develop and 
execute)  
3) Planning Assessment 
Metrics informing the judgment of how well the post-
execution planning process is performed:  
x The number of indicator metrics integrated into the 
overall goal assessment (for example: if goal end-state 
is to influence future behavior, then more indirect 
present indicators would potentially lead to better 
inference of future behavior tendencies)  
x The fraction of actually executed missions for which 
a reliable measure of performance exists (for how 
many missions do we have the metrics needed to assess 
mission performance? for any given mission, how many 
salient performance metrics are we actually capturing 
for that mission?) 
x The number of lessons-learned distributed (clearly 
depends on how lessons and distribution are counted)  
4) Meta-Metric Learning 
Meta-metrics describing how well the relevance, coherence 
and planning assessment metrics support plan assessment, and 
enable improvement of the metrics: 
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x Inter-phase correlation (e.g., correlation of lessons-
learned distributed and follow-on planning preparation 
metrics over time might suggest little relationship 
between the two. Perhaps the value of the lesson should 
be included in the metric, or independently, whether the 
lesson-learned changed any process)  
x Intra-phase correlation (e.g., no correlation between 
asset attrition and assessment of satisfaction of goal 
state suggests that it might valuable to distinguish 
between “productive” and “unproductive” attrition) 
VI. ONTOLOGY-DRIVEN QUERYING OF PLAN  INFORMATION 
The kinds of representations described above are necessary to 
support Living Plan requirements. But they are not sufficient. 
Without the query support to populate them, the 
representations are vacuous. Since the underlying living plan-
related data requires the inference-based identification of 
objects with associated attribute and location information 
under conditions of uncertainty, ontology-driven query 
mechanisms will need to include probabilistic functions in 
addition to more traditional deductive ones. 
 Consider the following metric where we have underlined 
ontology terms to be used by the Living Plan framework: 
the percentage of operational anti-aircraft missile sites 
by area-of-operations for some given plan specification. 
Such a metric would be useful in determining the progress of 
an operational objective for example related to suppression of 
air defenses. Though seemingly straightforward, even this 
metric raises a number of interesting semantic challenges that 
need to be resolved by a query processor. 
As stated, the metric is conditioned on a user’s 
specification of a plan. Given a plan, the metric represents the 
percentage of operational anti-aircraft missile sites by area-of-
operations for the specified plan. The query processor thus 
needs to be able to ascertain area-of-operations associated with 
a given plan, something which could possibly vary over time. 
A. Indirect identification of plans 
Even the identification of the plan may be a non-trivial 
exercise. While in theory it may be possible to use a unique 
plan identifier to locate the desired plan, in practice the plan 
may be identified indirectly in a number of ways, such as: 
x Attributes: Using combinations of attributes such as 
plan phase (development, execution or post-
execution), Commander in charge of plan execution, 
approval date, and so on. 
x Containment: Identifying related plans through 
relations of containing or being contained within other 
plans: the AOP (Air Operations Plan) is contained 
within a specified Joint Campaign Plan, or conversely, 
for a Campaign Plan that contains a specified AOP. 
x Assets: By relating a plan to the assets associated with 
it during a given time frame, as when an AOP is 
tasking Squadron X in some given week. 
x Operational relation: For example, one plan precedes 
or succeeds another as pre-condition or sequel. Or two 
plans relate to each by having mutually dependent 
executions.
 
Figure 2: I2WD ontologies at http://milportal.org 
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One or more of these methods could be used in the query to 
identify the desired plan, requiring the query processor to apply 
additional knowledge of plan attributes and relations to 
properly parse the query to eventually locate the desired plan 
and its area-of-operations. 
B. Ontology-driven queries 
The complexity and dynamic nature of relationships 
between the plans and the involved information cannot be 
adequately represented in non-semantic technologies (for 
example in traditional databases). Moreover, direct traditional 
querying of such representations will be difficult to automate 
and maintain in the necessary flexible manner, and the results 
of such querying may not be capable of the needed rapid 
update to incorporate emerging important data. Our hypothesis, 
therefore, which draws on the work described in [7,8] is that a 
comprehensive and incrementally evolving set of Living Plan 
ontologies, drawing on the I2WD suite of ontologies (see 
Figure 2) can provide the needed nuanced representation of the 
plans, metrics, and of the semantics of the source data against 
which the querying is performed, while taking account of 
relationships between all of these components. Such an 
approach will lay a foundation for sophisticated querying and 
analytics enhanced by inference, and is designed above all, to 
enable agile changes to all components. Additionally, the 
ontology framework will have to include representations of 
complicating factors such as those described below and their 
relationships with the plans and metrics. 
C. Probabilistic ontological classifications 
One example complication concerns the identification of 
the location constraint for those sites that are to be considered 
because they lie within the area-of-operations. The problem 
turns on the fact that there may be sites physically outside this 
area that are identified as harboring capabilities that project 
into the area-of-operations. This may imply an ambiguity at the 
operational level. If the focus is on assessing the performance 
of missions to disrupt or destroy sites physically within the 
area-of-operations, then the metric should be interpreted in one 
way. If, on the other hand, the intent of the metric is to assess 
the security of aircraft within the area-of-operations, then the 
better interpretation may extend the focus to include sites that 
have an air defense capability that reaches into the area-of-
operations from outside. In order to properly respond to a 
query based on the latter interpretation, the system would need 
to be able to infer such projection capabilities and perform 
spatial reasoning to find substantial intersections with the 
physical boundaries of the area-of-operations. Such capabilities 
may depend on the type of missiles available, requiring further 
information about specific missile capabilities and deployment. 
Another potential complication is bias in the identification 
of individual sites for counting. For example, the adversary 
might expend additional effort to hide remaining operational 
sites rather than sites that may have already been degraded in 
some way. Conversely, missile firings from operational sites 
make them more difficult to hide. At the same time, own-
forces may not expend as much effort in identification and 
counting of non-operational sites as those which still pose a 
threat. In short, the process of identifying and counting sites 
may be substantially different according to whether they are 
operational or non-operational. To provide appropriate 
measures of confidence in the associated metrics, the query 
processor would have to know what sorts of biases to consider 
and their relative magnitudes in terms of attributes such as 
power projection capability, which will be defined in our 
ontology framework. 
A likely more difficult counting complication would arise 
from semantic assembly of information regarding the very 
attribute of being operational as applied to sites. Whether a site 
is operational may be difficult to determine for multiple 
reasons. For example, if a site loses some part of its targeting 
capacity but retains ability to launch, then it is operational as a 
launch site, but without targeting it will pose little threat to 
modern aircraft. The state of the site may also be time-
dependent; for example, a site that is partially degraded could 
be anticipated to be restored at some point in the future. Such 
expectations would depend on the nature of the degradation 
and the resources available to make repairs and restore 
operation. At any particular time, the query processor would 
have to combine operational state attributes based on reports 
from different times and with varying levels of confidence 
arising from uncertainty in expectations as to whether a site 
will remain operational. 
Other complications might arise in classifying a site as 
functioning or not functioning as an ‘anti-aircraft missile site’. 
It is certainly possible that the raw intelligence information and 
sensor data on which counts are made will not directly and 
unambiguously classify a facility as an anti-aircraft missile site. 
Instead, there may be reports of a more specific nature (for 
example, that we are dealing with a specific type of missile 
capability) which through interaction with weapons ontology 
would be determined to qualify more generally as ‘anti-
aircraft’. On the other hand, some reports may refer only to a 
‘missile site’, which would then require further inference to 
determine if the site is likely to have a more specific type of 
anti-aircraft capability. Such inferences generally require the 
knowledge of type-subtype relations and the attributes on 
which such classifications are based. For example, information 
about a missile site supertype could be inferred to be also of the 
anti-aircraft missile site subtype through examination of other 
potentially known attributes, such as size and location of the 
site, imagery features, connectivity to other assets, and so on. 
Such information will be incorporated as probabilistic 
functions into our ontology framework. 
D. Missing, inconsistent and other invalid data 
Considering the fog of war, some information will at any 
given stage be incorrect, inconsistent, or missing. Barring 
independent evidence to the contrary, incorrect information, 
such as a site being reported as operational that is not, cannot 
be rectified. However, when there are multiple reports in 
conflict, it may be possible to reach a most likely conclusion. A 
query processor that maintains, or has access to, meta-
information regarding the typical or historically-observed 
believability of reports from various sources can combine 
conflicting reports as weighted evidence to reach a most 
believable conclusion. The needed provenance-related 
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attributes, too, will be incorporated into our ontology 
framework.  
A conflict in evidence may be due to understandable 
reasons, the simplest being that they were made at different 
times in relation to something that is changing, such as the state 
of a missile site. A more complex case would involve the 
ability of different sources to provide substantial evidence at 
different times or under different circumstances. For example, 
prior to actually observing an anti-aircraft missile site launch a 
weapon, a determination of its state of operation may be 
difficult to establish. An intact-looking site might be non-
operational for reasons that are not directly observable, such as 
broken electronic or computer-based equipment. Under these 
circumstances, direct observation might provide credible 
evidence of non-operational status (the physical structure may 
be visibly degraded or destroyed), without being able to 
provide evidence of operational status. Intelligence reports 
from intercepted communications would be a better source of 
information under these circumstances, but only if they are to 
be believed as genuine and not intentional misinformation. Of 
course, direct observation of a successful missile launch at a 
later point in time would over-rule any prior assertions about 
the site’s state, but only until contravening reports are later 
received indicating that its state may have changed, such as a 
battle damage assessment that it was successfully struck and 
destroyed at an even later point. 
Such issues, related to reports of the changing state of a 
missile site, may be interpreted differently depending on the 
purpose of the associated metric. If the intent is to assess 
progress of given actions toward an operational objective of 
reducing the risk of operations in a given airspace, then the 
most important information is the conversion through those 
actions of known operational sites into non-operational sites. In 
that case, for example, it would be less important to know 
which sites were non-operational for other reasons prior to the 
start of the campaign. At the same time, the change in state of a 
particular site would presumably be the effect of some action 
taken, and such information would aid in the interpretation of 
the action reports. For example, if the site were observed to be 
launching missiles prior to a kinetic strike on the facility and 
no launches were observed after the strike, it would be 
reasonable to believe that the strike had its intended effect in 
rendering the site non-operational. On the other hand, if the 
metric is being used primarily to ascertain the relative risk of 
operations in that airspace, then the numbers of operational and 
non-operational sites prior to the campaign become important, 
as well as the previously-discussed issue of sites being restored 
to operation over time. 
In addition to incorrect and conflicting information, the 
query processor must also deal with missing information. In 
some circumstances reports may be available only for certain 
time periods, or concerning certain types of information. For 
example we may have reports on site location without state of 
operation information, or only assertions of being operational 
but not of being non-operational. Such differences in missing 
information will add complexity to making a reliable estimate 
of the ratio of operational to non-operational sites over a given 
area of interest. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
To support the Secretary of Defense’s vision for Living 
Plans, we believe that plan-related ontologies need to be 
extended into two areas: 
x A generic planning process ontology that is based on 
the Information Artifact Ontology and that takes into 
account the cyclical process of planning.  
x Ontologies containing representations of each of the 
kinds of attributes and relations needed to identify 
desired plans according to relevant areas-of-
operations, assets, capabilities, and so forth. 
Additionally, the query processing component of any plan-
related computational framework that converts potentially 
huge stores of plan-related expressions (data types, values, 
natural language expressions), into user-oriented actionable 
metrics needs to be aware not merely of the ontologies, but 
also of the needed types of deductive transformations and, as 
we showed above, of probabilistic classifications. 
Materialized query processing tools will rely on the 
principles set forth in [7, 8] which are being used to integrate 
diverse data in a variety of disciplines. The approach is 
designed to achieve integration in an agile, flexible and 
incremental way, and also to incorporate into our system the 
ontology content created for related purposes by our 
collaborators in different military domains and disciplines. 
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